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The Chilean  personal  pension  plans introduced  in 1981  repre-
sent  a successful  reform  of a financially  insolvent  public  pension
system. They show  that radical  pension  reform is feasible  and
can  overcome  adverse  initial  conditions  such  as  high fiscal  costs
of transition,  the absence  of well-developed  financial  markets,
and weak regulation  and supervision.
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This paper  - a product  of the Financial  Policy and Systems  Division, Country  Economics  Department
-is  part  of a larger  effort  in the  department  to study  contractual  savings  institutions.  Copies  are available
free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Please contact  Wilai
Pitayatonakam,  room N9-003,  extension  37664  (February  1992,  38 pages).
Many  developing  countries,  especially  in Latin  interests  of pension  fund members.  These
America  and Eastem Europe,  have unfunded  include  such rules as "one account  per worker"
pay-as-you-go  public pension  systems  that face  and "one pension  fund per AFP,"  as well as tight
growing  financial  pressures.  These  emanate  from  limits on investment  assets.  The main  objective
a weak link between  contributions  and benefits,  of investment  rules has been to ensure that
from widespread  evasion,  and from an aging  pension funds  are invested  safely  and profitably.
population.  As the system  has matured,  some rules have
been relaxed.  The rules have also provided  for
Proposals  for radical  pension reformn  are  effective  supervision  and for information  disclo-
often inhibited  by concems about  the fiscal  cost  sure both to the authorities  and to members.
of transition  from an unfunded  to a funded
system,  the absence  of well-developed  financial  Pension  funds  have  proved major  sources  of
systems,  and weak regulation  and supervision.  long-term  finance  and have  made a sgnificant
contribution  to the pF  i'atization of public
Chile successfully  reformrc its public  utilities.  But their role in encouraging  a disper-
pension system  in 1981  when it introduced  a  sion of corporate  ownership  has been more
government  mandated  and regulated,  but pn-  limited because  of the reluctance  of corporations
vately managed  system. Based  on individual  to abide  by the strict governance  rules that aim to
capitalization  accounts  operated  by specialized  protect the interests  of pension funds  as minority
financial  institutions  - known  as  shareholders.
Administradoras  de Fondos  de Pensiones  or
AFPs  - the system  has provided  considerable  The Chilean  experience  shows  that there is a
scope for competition  and efficiency  within  a  positive  dynamic  interaction  between  pension
well-regulated  environment.  funds  and securities  markets  so long as a strong
regulatory  and supervisory  mechanism  is in
Vittas  and Iglesias  analyze  the rationale  of  place. It has also shown that it is feasible  to
the Chilean  pension  system and examine  in  finance  the costs of transition  from an unfunded
detail the rules and provisions  regarding  cover-  to a funded  system.
age, contribution  rates, pension  benefits,  and
investment  regulations.  But the prospects  of personal  pension  plans
in different  countries  must be assessed  case-by-
They also provide  a detailed  assessment  of  case to ensure that their introduction  does not
the structure  and performance  of the system,  its  undermine  programs  of macroeconomic  stabili-
impact  on financial  sector  development,  and the  zation and is accompanied  by extensive  regula-
role of regulation  and supervision.  tory reform.
Vittas  and Iglesias  emphasize  the  draconian
rules  that have been imposed  to protect  the
ThePolicy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the frmdings  of work under way in the Bank. Anobjective of the series
is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished. The findings, interpretations, and
conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official Bank policy.
Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination CenterTHE RATIONALE AND PERFORMANCE
OF
PERSONAL PENSION PLANS IN CHILE
Dimitri Vittas and Augusto Iglesias
Table of Contents
I.  Introduction  1
II.  Basic Operating Characteristics and their Rationale  3
M.  The Performance of AFPs  19
IV.  Policy Issues and Lessons of the Chilean Experience  33
References  38I.  INTRODUCTION
Chile implemented  a revolutionary  reform of its social security system in May 1981, when it
replaced  the pre-existing social pension system with a private system of personal pension  plans.  The
Chilean reform has attracted considerable  attention,  both because  of its early success and because of
the growing financial  pressures facing  the social security systems of many developing  ccuntries.
The main ingredient  of the Chilean  pension reform was the replacement  of a mature social
pension system, operating on a "pay-as-you-go' (PAYG)  basis and facing great financial  difficulties,
with a fully-funded  pension system based on individual  capitalization  accounts. The new system is
government  mandated  and regulated but privately  managel. Its management  is entrusted  to specialized
pension fund management  companies, known  as Administradoras  de Fondos de Pensiones  or AFPs.
Participation  in the new system is compulsory  for all dependent  employed  workers, including
civil servants, but optional for self-employed  people.  Moreover, members  of the armed forces
continue  to have their own pension scheme. At the time of its introduction,  participation  was also
optional  for members of the old system, although  special financial incentives  were provided  to
encourage  workers to switch to the new system. Thus, the APP  system coexists  with the old system
for already retired people and those workers who did not transfer to the new system and the system
for the armed forces.
The early success  of the Chilean AFP system can be seen from a number of key statistics:
*  The total number  of affiliates increased  from 1.4 million  people (or 39% of the
Chilean labor force) in 1982 to 3.8 million  (or 79% of the labor force) in 1990,
although the number  of active contributors  (defined  as workers making  contributions
in December  of each year) rose from 25% to 42% of the labor force over the same
period.
*  Annual contributions  reached 3.4% of GDP, up from 1.9% in 1982.
*  Pension  funds achieved  very high real rates of return, averaging 13% per year
between 1981 and 1990,
*  Total funds accumulated  in the personal  pension plans grew at a real rate of 47% per
year.  In relation  to GDP, pension funds increased from less than 1  % in 1981 to
26.5  % in 1990.
*  Pension  funds play a big part in the financial  markets.  In 1990, they held 20% of all
bank deposits, 38% of central  bank securities, nearly 100%  of treasury securities,
56% each of mortgage  and corporate bonds, and 9% of corporate equities.
*  Pension funds played a very significant  part in the mid-1980s  in the privatization  of
state-owned  companies,  mostly public utilities, where their total equity positions  vary
between 10% and 35% of each firm's equity.
1*  Their impact on the dispersion  of corporate ownership  and the development  of the
Chilean equity market has been limited, to a large extent because of the strict
investment  rules applied on their equity investments. Their equity holdings in
privatized  firms accounted  for nearly 90% of their total equity investments.
*  Concentration  of the pension fund industry is high, although it has fal.en considerably
in recent years.  The 3-firm concentration  ratio fell from 74% of total pension funds
in 1981  to 63% in 1990, while the Herfindahl  index  dropped from 2220 to 1577.
*  The industry is contestable  with low cost entry and intense  competition  among
incumbent  firms.  Net commissions  (excluding  premiums  for disability and term life
insurance)  fell from 23% of contributions  in the early years to 15% in the past couple
of years and from 14% of total assets under management  to 2.3%.
The very success of the Chilean pension reform raises many questions  that are of interest to
policymakers  of other developing  countries. What accounts  for its success? How extensive is the
coverage  of the new system? Is participation  compulsory  for covered workers? What is the level of
contributions? What is the level of pensions? Are pensions guaranteed? What is the role of
indexation? Is the treatment of workers equitable? How expensive  is private management  (an
important  feature of the new system)? What is the role of regulation? What is the impact  of the new
system on the financial  markets? How was the transition implemented  and financed? Last, but by no
means  least, what are its macroeconomic  implications,  especially  for the level of national  savings and
the functioning  of financial  and labor markets?
This is a long list of questions  that cannot all be addressed in one paper.  Moreover, the more
complex  macroeconomic  issues  are still subject  to debate and have yet to be properly assessed. The
main purpose of this paper is to discuss the rationale  of the basic operating characteristics  of the
Chilean system (section  11)  and review the performance  of the system over the first ten years of its
existence  (section  III).  Section IV concludes  with a summary  of the policy issues and main lessons of
the Chilean experience  for other developing  countries. Although  no attempt is made to provide a
comprehensive  account of the Chilean reform, the paper also addresses briefly some of the wiaer
issuer identified  above, especially  the fiscal implications  of the transition and the implications  for the
develc  -- <-mt  of financial markets.
ihis paper updates  and extends  an earlier unpublished  World Bank Working  Paper on the
privatization  of the pension system by Lacey (1987). It also draws heavily on the extensive literature
on the AFP system by Chilean authors, in particular  the papers by Arellano (1984), Ariztia (1991)
and Iglesias (1990)1. -he statistical  data are mostly  drawn from the publication  by Habitat (1991)
covering the first ten years of operation of the AFP system.
An extensive  bibliography  on the Chilean  pension system  is contained  in Iglesias  (1990).
2II.  BASIC OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS  AND THEIR RATIONALE
This section  describes briefly the rules governing  the Chilean pension system and analyzes
their rationale. The implications  of the use of these rules and some alternative  suggestions  are also
discussed.
2.1  Coverage
Coverage  of the AFP pension system is far from universal. Participaticn  is compulsory  for
all dependent  employed workers, but is optional for self-employed  people. Moreover, people who are
temporarily  out of work or are covered by special government  employment  schemes are exempt from
making  contributions. The scheme covers civil servants and other government  employees, except for
members  of the armed forces.
Compulsory  participation  is premised  on the argument that people behave myopically  and will
not make adequate  provision for their retirement needs under a voluntary  system.  Compulsory
participation  is a common  feature of most social security systems, at least for major groups of
workers.  It is also a feature of national  provident funds.
Self-employed  people do not have to participate  in the system for two main reasons: first,
because  self-employed  are presumed  to be financially  sophisticated  and independent  and able to make
their own provisions  for their future; and second, because of the difficulty  of ascertaining  their annual
income and ensuring payment of their contributions. However, this provision leaves a big hole in the
Chilean system and is an important  factor in the substandally  less than universal  coverage of the
system. Although it is true that many self-employed  people, especially  professionals,  are financially
independent  and able to provide for their own future needs, others are not only poor but also
financially  unsophisticated. Without compulsory  saving, they are likely to rely on government
support in old age.  However, making pension saving compulsory  for self-employed  people is a
problem that afflicts most pension systems.
Compulsory  participation  raises problems  of moral hazard and evasion, especially  when
contribution  rates are high and the link between  contributions  and benefits is weak.  In Chile, the
strong link between contributions  and benefits, the generally  low rate of contributions  and the offer of
the benefits of tax deferral have played a part in reducing  evasion. However, compulsory
participation  imposes  an obligation  on governments  to develop an effective  regulatory system to
ensure that pension funds are invested  prudently and profitably.
Transfer of workers  to the new system has been stimulated  by an I1 Yo  effective increase in
net wages  to transferring  workers (Iglesias, 1990). In addition,  the government  undertook  to issue
recognition  bonds to transferring  workers for their accrued pension benefits  under the old system.
The value of these bonds is calculated  at the time of transfer to the new system. Recognition  bonds
accumulate  real interest at 4% per year but are payable only upon the retirement  of individual
members. Although  this is a reasonable  real rate of return for a long-term  instrument, it has been
substantially  less than the real rates of interest that have prevailed in the Chilean financial  markets in
the 1980s.
32.2  Contributions
Active participants  must make contributions  equal to 10% of their monthly salary, up to a
level equivalent  to 60 U.FY. The contributiorns  are paid by enmployees  but employers  are required to
withhold  the relevant amount every month and transfer the collected  sums to the pension fund
management  company  concerned 3. Participants  are also allowed  to make voluntary contributions  of
up to an additional  amount equivalent  to 60 U.F.
Affihiates  are also required to pay premiums  for disability  and term life insurance. The level
of premiums  depends on the rates obtainable  in the insurance  market and they vary from one AFP to
another.  Furthermore, affiliates  are required to pay an additional  variable  commission  fee that,
together with the insurance  premiums, amounts  on average to 3% of pensionable  salary.  Thus, the
effective  contribution  rate in Chile varies between  different AFPs but amounts  on average to 13% of
pensionable  salary 4.
Both mandatory  and voluntary  co;,tributions  are tax deductible  but benefits are subject  to
income tax as any other type of income.  The irivestment  income of pension funds is also free from
tax.  Thus, the Chilean system confers the benefa.s  of tax deferral orn  pension savings and avoids the
double taxation  of savings through pension plans.  This provides a tax incentive  to stimulate
participation  in the system, but has negative  cashflow implications  for the fiscal budget since it
implies lower tax revenues initially. Chile was able to adopt this approach  becaust of the budgetary
surplus achieved  at the time of the introduction  of the new system.  The alternative  approach  to the
fiscal treatment  of pensions is the so-called  exemption  deferral, whereby contributions  are not tax
deductible  but pensions are tax free.  Exemption  deferral also avoids the double  taxation of savings
and encourages  saving through pension plans, but does not have the negative  cashflow implications  of
the tax deferral approach'.
The relatively low level of mandatory  contributions  implies the expectation  of a high real rate
of return, a declining  proflle of real wage growth and/or targeting relatively  modest replacement
rates.  Under certain assumptionK  (e.g. workers contribute  for 40 years, draw pension for 20 years
and pensions are indexed  to price inflation),  a contribution  rate of 10% will pay pensions  equal to
between 55%  and 60% of final gross salary if the real rate of return exceeds  the rate of growth of
2  U.F. are the  so-called  Unidades  de Fomento  that  are linked  to changes  in the consumer  price  index  and
are used  extensively  in Chile  for indexing  all kinds  of financial  contracts.
3  In Chile, the nominal  and effective  contribution  rate is the same.  In other countries,  the effective
contribution  rate, which takes account of the payments  made by employers  and the government, is lower than the
nominal  contribution  rate.  In Egypt the nominal  contribution  rate is 26% - 10% by the employee, 15% by the
employer  and 1% by the govemment. Thus, contributions  equal 26 out of a total payroll cost of 116 or slightly
over 22%.
4  Affiliates  are also charged  a flat fee per collection. This varies between  AFPs but is deducted  from the
individual  account. Since 1988  the flat fee has been deducted  only from active contributors. Although  the flat fee
affects the rates of return on individual  accounts,  it does not increase  the effective  contribution  rate.
s  For a discussion  of the fiscal treatment  of pensions  see Vittas (1990). A better term for the alternative
fiscal treatment  of contributions  and pensions  may be deferred  exemption.
4real wages by 3 percentage  points.  On the other hand, if the real rate of return is equal or very close
to the rate of growth of real wages, the replacement  rate will range betweeq  20% and 30% of final
gross salary 6.
But if real wages rise at a higher rate when workers are young and at a lower rate when they
grow older, the early accumulation  of pension fund balances  will contribute  to the achievement  of a
higher replacement  rate than if the rate of real wage growth accelerated  over the life of workers.
Thus, the adequacy  of contributions  must be assessed  in the context of the time and age profile c  ¢
wages,
It is worth noting that in Singapore  and Malaysia,  which have long operated  national
provident  funds, the effective contribution  rate is respectively  33% and 18%7.  In Singapere, the
effective  rate was set at 40% in the mid-1980s  (Vittas  and Skully, 1991). The higher contribution
rates in these two countries  may be explained  by the expectation  of higher wage growth and, by
imiplication,  a narrower (perhaps  negative)  differential  between  real rates of return and real wage
growth rates.
2.3  Individual Accounts
Participants  must affiliate with one AFP of their choice and must have one individual
capitalization  account.  Mandatory  and voluntary  contributions  are used to buy quotas or units of the
pension fund of the AFP of their choice, which are then credited to the affiliat.-'s  account.
The requirement  to place all funds into one individual  Xapitalization  account is premised  on
the need to keep the system simple and transparent. It is also a big factor in fighting evasion.
Admittedly,  allowing  affiliates  to maintain  accounts  with more than one AFP would enable individuals
to hedge their bets and reduce their dependence  on the performance  of the m-nagement  of a particular
AFP, but it would undermine  the simplicity  and trailsparency  of the system.
Affiliates  have the right to transfer their account  to another AFP.  The time required for
processing  transfers of accounts  implies  that transfers are effectively  limited  to two a year. The right
to transfer accounts (and the minimum  investment  return requirements  imposed  on AFPs - see below)
alleviate  the risk of large losses  from the imposed  lack of diversification  of individual  accounts.
The right to transfer accounts imparts a strong element  of competition  among AFPs.
Although  there is a danger of excessive  spending on advertising and marketing  to attract affiliates
from competing  institutions, the right to transfer is a strong safeguard  against inefficiency  and
indifferent  investment  returns.
6  The  relation  between  contribution  and  pension  rates  under  different  assumptions  about  rates  of return  and
wage  growth is discussed in Vittas  (1992). These calculations  apply  to the payment  of old age pensions, which
depend  on the level of contributions  and the real rate of investment  returns.  Disability  and survivorship  pensions
are "defined  benefits' financed  with the funds accumulated  in the individual  accounts  plus an insurance  policy.
7  In Singapore,  - nominal  contribution  rate is 40%  divided  equally  between  employers  and employees,
while in Malaysia  it is 20%, divided  between  employers 11  % and employees  9%.
5Affiliates  may also open voluntary  savings accounus  with AFPs.  These do not benefit from
tax deferral, i.e. voluntary  savings are not tax deductible. However, the investment  income of
voluntary  savings accounts benefits  from tpx deferral provided  total voluntary  savings do not exceed a
limit that is set each month (at the time of %  'riting the limit is 15 million  pesos, equivalent  to USS
44,000).  Voluntary  savings accounts  must be invested  in the same pension fund as the contributions
of the ,ndividual  capitalization  accounts.
2.4  Pensions  and Other Benerits
System benefits include  old age, disability  and survivorship  pensions. The AFP system is
effectively  a combination  of a defined-contribution  system for old age pensions  and a defined-benefit
system for disability  and survivorship  pensions (as well as for life annuities bought at the time of
retirement  or at a later stage)@.  Defined  benefits are covered by appropriate  insurance policies.
Old age pensions are financed entirely  by the capital accumulated  in individual  capitalization
accounts. They are paid to affiliates reaching retirement age (65 years for men, 60 years for
women). Retired members  are able to buy a life annuity from an insurance  company  (which may or
may not be related to the same AFP), to make scheduled  monthly  withdrawals  from their accounts,  or
to combine scheduled  withdrawals  with the purchase  of a deferred annuity.
Scheduled  withdrawals  are determined  each year on the basis of the remaining  life expectancy
of the family groups of affiliates and the rate of return of the pension fund.  They are paid on a
monthly  basis like life annuities and are fixed in U.F. terms, thus providing  protection  against
inflation  during the year.  Members who opt initially for scheduled  withdrawals  may convet to a life
annuity at a later stage.
Scheduled  withdrawals  have two advantages  over life annuities: in the event of early death,
remaining  accour&  balances are inherited  by dependents; and, they allow  participation  in higher
returns achieved  by pension fund investments. Life annuities  offer longer-term  protection  against
inflation  and against excessive  longevity, but they may be based on more conservative  real rates of
return and mortality  tables.
Affiliates  may withdraw in a lump sum any balance in excess of the necessary  capital to pay a
pension equal to 70% of pensionable  salary.  Early retirement is allowed if the balances  accumulated
in an individual  capitalization  account are sufficient  to pay a pension equal to 50% of the average
salary over the last 10 years of employment.
Disability  pensions are paid to active members  that are disabled  under circumstances  not
covered  by labor accident  and worker compensation  insurance. Disability is certified by special
medical  committees  set up by the supervisory  agency.  Survivorship  pensions  are paid to the surviving
spouse and other dependents  of deceased active  or passive affiliates.
$  In defined-contribution  systems, benefits depead on  the level of contributions and  the investment
performance  of each pension fimd. In contrast, defined-benefit  systems  promiso  pensions  that are either fixei in
nominal  or real terms or are related to pensionable  salary.  In the latter systems  if contributions  and mvestment
retrns  are inadequate,  the sponsor (which  may be the state or individual  companies)  would be  required to make
up the difference.
6Disability and survivorship  ponsions  are defined  benefits. They are financed with the balance
of the individual  capitalization  account  of the disabled or deceased affiliate, but AFPs are obligated  to
make up any difference  to reach the required pension.  AFi's are required to arrange insurance  on a
group basis to cover disability  and survivorship  pensions  for the combined  life expectancy  of 'amily
groups.
System benefits enjoy a state guarantee  that if they fall below the minimum  pension the
government  will make up the difference. The minimum  pension is nct set as a constant  fraction of
the minimum  wage and it is adjusted  for inflation  each time the accumulated  CPI exceeds 15%.  It is
currently equal to 73% of the minimum  wage for people of less than 70 year of age and 77% for
older people.  The guarantee  is offered to people who have contributed  for at least twenty years and
is aimed to protect workers with low wages and unstable  working careers.
The offer of the guarantee  in conjunction  with the option  to use scheduled  withdrawal 3 from
the capitalization  account, instead  of buying a lif. annuity, creates a moral hazard problem in that
retired workers may opt for scheduled  withdrawals  on retirement, knowing  that in the event that their
actual life exceeds  their life expectancy  at the time of retirement, their reduced pensions in later years
would be covered  by the minimum  state guarantee. As already noted, scheduled  withdrawals  have the
additional  benefit that in the event of early death, the remaining  balance  on the account would be
inherited  by their dependents. A solution  to the moral hazard problem caused  by the offer of a state
guarantee  would be to require all retired workers  who opt for scheduled  withdrawals  to buy a
deferred life annuity  for at least the minimum  pension.
2.5  The Role of Indexation
Indexation  plays an impertant  part in the C' ilean AFP system, even though as a
fundamentally  defined-contribution  system, balances  accumulated  in individual  capitalization  accounts
are not legally indexed. Nevertheless,  several benefits, including  disability  and survivorship  pensions
as well as life annuities  bought, either at the time of retirement or at a later stage, are fully indexed.
In addition, the monthly  value of scheduled  withdrawals  is indexed  during the twelve months until its
next review.
The pension funds are effectively  mutual funds and their value may rise or fall, not only in
real terms but also in nominal terms.  In practice, the value of pension funds is protected  by the fact
that 95% of pension fund assets are invested  in indexed  assets or in assets that provide effective
hedges against inflation,  such as corporate equities. However, inflation  hedging  is not a regulatory
requirement  imposed  on pension fund managers  but rather reflects the widespread  use of indexed
instruments  in the Chilean financial  markets.
2.6  Management and Operation of the System
Only specialized  pension fund management  companies,  known in Chile as Administradoras  de
Fondos de Pensiones  or AFPs, are authorized  to participate  in the system. AFPs are regulated  and
supervised  by a specially  created agency, known  as Superintendencia  df AFP or SAFP.
Authorization  criteria.  AFPs must meet the minimum  capital requirements  set in the law.
The minimum  capital  was initially  set at 20,000 U.F, but in an attempt  to encourage new entry and
7greater competitioni,  the minimum  capital  requirement  was modified ni 1987. Currentlv tde follov:-ng
schedule applies:
Affiliatee  Minimum  Capltal
0  - 5,000  J.F.  5,000  (US$  150,000;
5,000  - 7,499  U.F.  10,000  (US$  300,000)
7,500  - 9,999  U.e  . 15,000  (US$  450,000)
10,000  and  over  U.F  20,000  (US$  600,000)
AFPs are set up as joint-stock  companies  and can be established  by any group of
shareholders,  inrluding large corporations,  trade associations,  labor unions, other financial
institut .-s, and groups of workers. However, banks are not allowed to own shares in AFies. SAFP
is not specifically  authorized  to vet the management  and shareholders  of AFPs, although it has to
approve  the charter of each new AFP.
Each AFP is allowed 'o operate only one pension  fund for all its affiliates.  fhe pension fund
is an independent  en..ty and is seg-egated  both legally and financially  from the AFT'  The assets of
the pension fund belong vxclusively  to the affiliates, are not attachable  and are not affected  by any
financial  losses suffered by the AF.
The requirement  that each AFP must operate orly one pension fund for all its affiliates, like
the similar requiremnent  of one individual  account per affiliate, aims to preserve the si .plicity and
transparency  of the whole system.  These two operating principles  are parcicularly  important  for
compulsory  privately-run  pension systems  that involve  large numbers of people with limited
experience  of long-term financial  products.  More sophisticated  systems could dispense with these two
restrictive  requirements,  although  care would need to be taken to avoid an excessive  proliferation  of
pension funds that might complicate  the management  and regulation  of pension funds and might harm
the best long-term interests of pension fund members.
Investment  reserves.  AFPs are required to maintain  investment  reserves, known as "encaje",
equal to  1  % of the total assets of the pension fund undjr their management. This limit was originally
set at 5% of total assets but, as pension funds grew, it was deemed excessive  and the requirement  was
lowered  to its present level in 1983.
The investment  reserves of each AFP must be invested  in the same assets as the pension fund
under its management. This measure aims  to protect the interests  of pension fund members by
ensuring that the AFPs will apply the same professionalism  in investing  the resources of the pension
fund as for their own resources.
All transactions  of the pension fund must be carried out at officially  recognized  markets where
thev can be effectively  supervised. AFPs are *equired  to establish  custody agreements  with custodial
r.utions  for the safekeeping  of the securities in which they invest. Custodial  institutions  are
authorized  by the central bank but for the time being no such institutions  have been authorized  and all
custodial agreements  are held with the central bank.
Minimum  Drofitability  reauirerlents.  Pension funds are valued daily at market prices.  AFPs
are subject to  maximum  and ininimum  return (or profitability)  requirements  for the pension fund
under their management. These are set in relation to the average performance  of all pension funds
over any twelve-month  period.  Thus, if the real investment  return is 50% higher than the average for
8all pension funds, or exceeds the average by 2 percentage  points (whichever  yield, the higher rate of
return), the AFP is required to placea  the difference  in a profitability  reserve. 'This  reserve does not
helong  to the AFP, but is an asset of the pension fund.  Similarly,  if the real investment  returr on a
pension fund is less than half the average of all pension funds, or if it is lower than the average by 2
percentage  points (whicnever  yields the lower rate of return), the AFP is required to make up the
difference, first by transferring funds from the profitability  reserve (if such a reserve has been
established)  and, if this is inadequate,  from its investment  reserves 9.
The maximum  and minimum  limits on pension fund returns aim to protect affiliates  from
excessive  fluctuations  in returns and frow.  wide dispersion  between  different AFPs. The use of a 12-
month average may, however, place undue emphasis  on short-term  performance  and is not very
satisfactory  for long-term contracts that may span 60 years or more.  In fact, an AFP that performs
persistently at the lower end ot the permitted range would ove-.  the years produce substantially  lower
returns than the average.
An alternative  approach  would be to apply additional  and narrower limits on the performance
over longer periods, such as 36 or 60 months. Moreover, instead  of applying a limit of 50% higher
. lower than the average, which may be either unduly permissive  or unduly restrictive, the limits
could be based on specified  multiples  of standard  deviation  from the average.  Thus, the 12-month
limit could apply on performance  that is higher or lower by 2 standard deviations  than the average,
while  the longer 36- or 60-menth limit could be based on divergence  by one standard  deviation  from
the average.
Revenu,  The main revenues  of AFPs, apart from the returns on their investment  reserves,
are the fees they charge for managing  individual  capitalization  accounts. AFPs compete  with each
other for managing  individual  accounts and the level of commissions  is set freely.  However,
restrictions  apply on the types of fees that may be levied.
Authorized  fees include a fixed fee per collection  and a pro rata fee on wrges on which
contributions  are based as well as fees for opening  new accounts, fees per pension payment and fees
for voluntary savings accounts. Although  AFPs would not normally levy account opening  fees, they
may charge such fees if they want to discourage  new accounts. Account  opening  fees m.ay  also be
used for financing  the build-up  of the investment  reserve requirement  (encaje). On the other hand, in
order to prevent the setting of high closing  fees that might discourage  the transfer of accounts, AFIPs
are not allowed  to levy fees for closing  accounts.
AFPs were initially  also allowed  to charge a management  fee on the total value of funds under
management. 'his  fee created  problems  for affiliates  who were out of work and were unable to make
contributions. Their account  balance was declining  even though here was no -movement  in it.  In
September 1987, the regulations were changed  and this type of fee was disallowed.
The use of a flat fee per collection  has a regressive  impact  on low income  workers.  The
differences  in rates of return caused  by this fee may be significant,  especially  when compounded  over
40 years.  The flat fee was rather high in the early years of the system, but recently  most AFPs have
either abolished  their flat fees or have allowed  their real value to fall by failing to adjust it fully to
9  The 2 percentage  points limit comes into effect when the average rea! rate of return is less than 4%.
9inflation. As already noted, no commissions,  including  the flat fee, can be levied on inactive
accounts.
Information  disclosure. AFPs must meet rigorous information  disclosure  requirements. They
report daily to the supervisory  agency their investment  transactions  and submit monthly reports on
their financial position  and overall performance. They are also required to provide regular statements
(three times a year) to their affiliates  disclosing  the last four monthly contributions  paid by employers,
the financial  performance  of the pension fund and the accumulated  balance  and rate of return on their
individual  account.
An issue that is causing  some concern regards the advertising  policies of AFPs.  There is a
tendency  to publicize  perfowmance  over short-term  periods, especially  if it happens to exceed the
average by a big margin. This may provide a misleading  impression  of long-term prospects and may
encourage  frequent account transfers. These could prove counter-productive  in the sense that
unsophisticated  affiliates  may be moving  to a high-yielding  AFP only to find its performance
reverting to the mean for all AFPs.  A more accurate comparison  of relative performance  could be
obtained by advertising  rates of return based on a range of investment  periods ( say, 3 months, 1
year, 5 yep-s, etc.).  Moreover, both the performance  of the whole fund and that of individual
accounts  of different sizes, including  clear information  on commission  rates, should be inclueed in
publicity  material.
2.7  Investment Rules
AFPs are subject to very strict, almost draconian, investment  regulations. Two operating
principles  guide these rules: safety and profitability. Safety implies  that pension funds are invested  in
approved  assets and are properly divertified, while profitability  implies  that AFPs must be free to
seek the highest returns under these rules.
In compiiance  with these principles, only maximum  limits are imposed  on investments. AFPs
are not required to meet minimum  investment  ratios in government  securities and other assets (such as
housing bonds)  that may be safe but may yield below .n.arket  rates of return.  Also pension funds
cannot be used in government-sponsored  directed credit or investment  programs.
In setting investment  limits for corporate equities, a clear distinction  is drawn between so-
called "Chapter 12" and 'non-Chapter 12" companies.'"  Limits on pension fund investments  are
higher for Chapter 12 companies,  but to protect the interests  of pension funds such companies  must
have their investment  and financial  plans approved  by the annual general meeting  of shareholders  and
they must also designate  their essential  assets, the disposal of which require a 90% approval by
shareholders. These provisions  impose severe restrictions  on the independence  of management  and
for this reason only privatized  utilities have so far qualified  as "Chapter 12" companies.
Since 1985  approved  assets are rated by a Risk Classification  Committee  that is made up of
various regulatory  bodies and representatives  of the AFPs.  Debt securities are classified in several
risk categories  with varying portfolio limits for different classes  of instruments. Equities are either
'°  "Chapter  12"  companies  are  companies  that  abide  by  the  requirements  imposed  by Chapter  12  of Law  3500
that  govems  the operations  of pension  funds.
10approved  or rejected  for pension fund investment  purposes, although  investrnent  limits are weighted
by an ownership concentration  factor.
Table  I
Investment  Limits  per Instnument
(% of value  of fund)
a.  State  securities  45%
b.  Liabilities  of banking  institutions  50%
of which  short-term  liabilities  30%
c.  Mortgage  bonds  80%
d.  Corporate  bonds  50%
e.  Commercial  paper  10%
f.  Quotas  of other  pension  funds  20%
g.  Corporate  equities  30%
of which
"Chapter  12"  companies  30%
anon-Chapter  12' companies  10%
real estate  companies  i0%
h.  Shares  of investment  funds  10%
of which  venture  capital  companies  5%
i.  Foreign  securities*  2%
*  The  limit  is set by central  bank  subject  to a maximum  2% until  September  1992
Source: Habitat  (1991)
Investments  are subject to limits by instrument (or class of instruments)  and by issuer.  Limits
on investments  by instrument  aim to contain pension fund exposure  to the risks of particular
instruments. Limits by class of instruments  are required because  some instruments  have similar or
even identical  risks.  Failure to group instruments  that are subject to similar or identical  risks would
undermine  the objective  of risk diversification  that these limits aim to achieve.
The limits by instrument in force in 1990  as a proportion  of the value of the fund are shown
in Table 1.
Limits on investments  by issuer are determined  by several  different formulas, depending  on
the issuer, with the lowest limit being the binding one.  The main objective  of limits by issuer is to
avoid undue exposure  of individual  pension  funds as well as of the whole pension fund sector to
particular issuers or to particular liabilities  of different issuers. The following  limits are imposed:
a.  Limits expressed  as a share of the value of the funL  This applies to investments  in
the liabilities  or equity capital of an issuer as a share of the value of each pension
fund. Thus, pension funds are not allowed to invest more than 15% of the value of
their funds in the liabilities  of an individual  financial  (banking)  institution;  or more
than 7% of the value of the fund in the securities (bonds, commercial  paper and
11equity) of a nonfinancial  "Chapter 12" corporate issuer; or more than 5% of the fund
in quotas of another pension fund; or more than 1% of the value of the fund in
securities of "non-Chapter  12" companies;  or more than 0.5% of the fund in
individual  foreign securities.
b.  LiMits  expressed  as a share of particular instruments. The second limit applies to the
share of each issue  of corporate debt securities (bonds or commercial  paper by leasing
c:mpanies and other enterprises)  that can be taken up by an individual  pension fund
or to the share of the equity capital of an issuer that can be held by individual  pension
funds. This is set at 20% of each commercial  paper or corporate bond issue and 7%
of the equity capital of "Chapter 12" companies, 2.5% for banking  institutions, 1%
for "non-Chapter  12" companies, and 20% for specialized  real estate companies.
c.  Limits expressed  as a share of each fund in the total resources of all funds.  The third
limit applies  to the permitted  total exposure of the pension fund sector as a whole.
This takes account  of the normal leverage  of the issuer concerned. Thus, for
liabilities  of financial institutions,  essentially  banking institutions,  the total investments
of the whole pension  fund sector cannot exceed 3 times the total equity capital of all
fimancial  institutions. For liabilities  of leasing  companies  and nonfinancial
corporations,  the limit for the whole pension fund sector is 0.8 times their net capital.
The last limit applies to each individual  issue of securities by a leasing company  or
other enterprise.
d.  Limits exnressed  as a share of each issuer in the total liabilities  of all issuers from the
same sector,  rhis limit applies  to investments  in liabilities  of banking institutions  and
aims to prevent a big pension fund from investing  in a particular banking institution
more than a certain multiple  of its share of the total liabilities  of all banking
institutions. This limit effectively  replaces the second limit above, which does not
apply on banking  liabilities.
The third and fourth limits are weighted  by a risk factor set by the Risk Classification
Committee  for each issue of securities  and on a weighted  average basis for each issuer.  Corporate
equities must be approved by the Risk Classification  Committee  but are not risk rated.  The limits on
investments  in the equities of "Chapter 12" companies  are weighted  by an ownership concentration
factor that is also set by the Risk Classification  Committee. Investment  limits in individual
corporations  are a decreasing  function  of ownership  concentration. Tables 2 and 3 summarize  the
investment  limits per issuer currently in force.  (The chronology  of changes  in investment  regulations
is discussed  below.)
For pension fund managers in developed countries, who are generally  free to set their own
investment  guidelines, the application  of so many investment  limits would appear excessively
bureaucratic  and inefficient. Limits that are based on the share of an individual  pension fund in the
total value of all pension funds or in the share of liabilities  of an issuer in the total liabilities  of all
issuers  of the same class of instruments  may be onerous in practice and difficult  both to comply with
and to verify. Furthermore, there is a risk that imposing  excessively  strict investment  limits may
undermine  the concept of private management  and may in effect represent a government  direction  of
funds through the back door.
12Table 2
PENStON  FUNDS: INVESTMENT  LIMITS PER  ISSUER  t
State  securiti  s  - 45X of  fund
Liabilities  of  financial  institutions  The lesser  amount of:
*  15X of  the  fund
- 3 x  capital  x  Ft/Ft  ""
- 2.5  x Pi/Pt  ****  x  risk  factor  x  value  of  fund
Corporate bonds  The lesser  amount of:
- 20X of  issue
- (0.8  x  issuer's  net  capital  x  Fi/Ft  x  risk  factor)
less  investments in  bonds of  issuer's  subsidiaries.
Bonds  of  leasing  companies  The lesser  amount of:
- 20X of  issue
* (0.8  x  issuer's  net  capital  x  Fi/Ft  x  risk  factor)
less  investments in  bonds of  issuer's  subsidiaries.
Coffnercial  paper  The lesser  amount of:
- 20X of  issue
- (0.2  x  issuer's  net  capital  x  Fi/Ft  x  risk  factor)
less  investments in  commercial paper of  issuer's
subsidiaries.
Corporate equities**  The lesser  amount  of:
- "Chapter 12"  conpanies *  7X of  fund  x  concentration  factor  or
72  of  shares x  concentration  factor.
- "Non-Chapter 12"  conlpanies  - 1X of  fund,  or  1X of  shares.
- Real estate  companies  - 72  of  fund  x  concentration  factor  or
20X of  shares x  concentration  factor.
Investment in  shares,  bonds
and coffercial  paper of  the  same  issuer  - 7X of  fund
Quotas of  other  pension funds  - 52 of  fund
Quotas  of  investment funds **  - 102 of  fund
Foreign  issuers  - 0.5X of  fund
*  Investment limits  are  reduced by half  if  there  exists  a relationship  between the  issuer  and
shareholders,  executive  officers  or  directors  of  the  A.F.P.,  or  if  the  issuer  is  a shareholder  with
more than  12  of  the  A.F.P..  In  the  last  case,  the  investment  limit  for  shares is  zero.
In  the  case of  Banking Corporations  or  Credit  Institutes,  the  percentage of  shares has to  be 2.52.
***  In  the  case of  risk  capital  investment funds,  the  limit  must not  exceed 52 of  the  fund.
**"*  Fi/Ft  =  Investor  Fund/Total pension funds.
Pi/Pt  =  Issuer's  capital/Total  capital  financial  institutions.
Source:  Habitat  (1991)
13Table  3
CONCENTRATION  FACTORS  AND INVESTMENT  LIMITS
Shares  Percentage  majority  Concentration  Investment  limit  C*)
shareholder  (C)  factor
Shares  of "Chapter  12"  coqmnies
C  c  202  1  7.0X  Shares  or Fund
202  C  <  302  0.8  5.6X  Shares  or Fund
302 <  C  <  40X  0.6  4.2X Shares  or Fund
402 <  C  <  45X  0.4  2.82  Shares  or Fund
45X  C  <  50X  0.3  2.52  Shares  or Fund
50X  C  0  Must  not invest
Shares  of  "Non-Chapter  12"  companies  1.0X  Shares  or Fund
Shares  of  real  estate  companies
C  c  202  1  20  Shares  or  7X Fund
202 <  C  <  302  0.8  16X  Shares  or  5.6X  Fund
30i <  C  <  40X  0.6  122  Shares  or  4.2X  Fund
402  <  C  <  45X  0.4  8X Shares  or  2.82  Fund
45X <  C  <  50X  0.3  6X Shares  or  2.5X  Fund
50X <  C  0  Must  not  invest
(')  The lesser  amount  is  applied.
Source: Habitat  (1991)
14However, in the context of the experience  of developing  countries, the absence  of strong and
transparent  capital markets, the compulsory  nature of the pension system and the lack of familiarity  of
pension members  with cap.tal market investments,  the detailed investment  rules appear iustified,
provided  they are revised in a flexible  and timely manner to take account of the growing maturity of
the system.  Moreover, an approach  of gradual liberalization  would give the opportunity  to pension
fund managers to develop  their skills as professional  investment  managers  and would also allow the
capital markets to modernize. As noted by Lacey (1987), it was fortunate that AFPs were not
allowed to invest in corporate equities  during the 1982-84  financial  crisis.
In Chile, revisions in the investment  rules have been effected  at regular intervals. Initially,
investments  were limited to public sector securities (essentially,  treasury and central bank liabilities),
bank liabilities, mortgage  and corporate bonds, and quotas of other pension fi nds.  The initial limits
were 100% for state securities, 80% for mortgage bonds, 70% for bank liabilities,  60% for corporate
bonds, and 20% for quotas of pension funds".
The following  changes  were effected  in subsequent  years:
1982  The limit on bank liabilities  was reduced  to 40%.
1985  The limit on state securities was lowered to 50% and that of corporate bonds to 40%.
Investments  in equities of privatized  state enterprises  were allowed up to 30% of the
value of the fund.  A limit per issuer was also imposed  equal to 5% of the value of
the fund or of the capital of the issuer.
The Risk Classification  Committee  was created  consisting  of 7 members: 3
representatives  from the AFPs, a representative  of the central bank and the 3
Superintendents  of financial  institutions  (AFPs, Securities  and Insurance, and Banking
and Financial  Institutions). The use of risk factors  was introduced.
1986  The authorization  to invest in equities was extended to corporations  set up as joint
stock companies,  provided  no individual  shareholder  held more than 20% of the
equity capital (dispersed  ownership).
1988  The ownership  concentration  limit for investments  in corporate equities  was raised to
50% and the use of concentration  factors was introduced.
The provision  for investments  in the  quotas  or units  of other  pension  funds  aimed  to enable  small  AFPs
to benefit  from  the  professional  investment  management  skills  of the  larger  AFPs. It was  meant  to encouage  new
er-.ry  into  the AFP system  and stimulate  greater  competition.  However,  the provision  has not been  used  by any
AFP.
151989  The limit on investments  in equities  of "Chapter 12" companies  was raised to 7% of
the value of the fund or the capital of the issuer.
Investments  in "Non-Chapter  12" companies  was allowed  subject to a limit of 1% of
the value of the fund or the capital of the issuer.
Investments  in real estate companies  were authorized  subject to an aggregate  limit of
10% of the value of the fund and an individual  limit of 7% of the fund or 20% of the
capital of the issuer (real estate companies  were authorized  to grant mortgage loans
and invest in mortgage  bonds or mortgage-backed  securities).
The composition  of the Risk Classification  Committee  was changed by replacing  the
representative  of the central bank with a fourth member from the AFPs and thus
conferring majority  control to the private sector.
1990  Pension  funds were authorized  to invest:
- in commercial  paper up to 10% of the value of the fund;
- in shares of investment  funds up to 10%; and
- in foreign securities. For the latter, a 1% limit is to apply initially. This will
increase  by an additional 1% over the next three years and will jump to 10%
on the fifth year.  However, the specific  regulation  governing investments  in
foreign securities has yet to be issued.
The limit for state securities was lowered further to 45%.
The limit for bank liabilities  was raised to 50% with a sublimit of 30% on short-term
liabilities  Oess  than 1 year).
The limit on corporate bonds was raised to 50%.
These changes  reflect a flexible  response to the pressures and opportunities  affecting  the
operations  of AFPs.  Thus, the authorization  to invest in the shares of real ertate companies is a
response  to strong pressn,res  for greater involvement  of AFPs in housing and mortgage finance.  On
the other hand, authorization  of foreign securities represents  a recognition  of the maturity of the
system, the large size of the pension funds in relation to the rest of the financial system, and the
growing need for country risk diversification.
Pension  funds are still prohibited  from investing  in the shares of AFPs and insurance
companies. The prohibition  of investments  in other AFPs aims to avo.d further concentration  in the
industry, while in the case cf insurance  companies,  it aims to avoid  potential conflicts of interest
given the contractual  and common  ownership  ties between insurance  companies  and AFPs.
Moreover, because insurance  companies  and AFPs engage in similar activities, such investments
would not provide adequate  diversification.
16Pension  funds were not allowed  to invest in mutual funds, but after the 1990 changes  in
investment  rules, they are now authorized  to invest  in closed end investment  trusts.  Investments  in
open end mutuai funds are still not permitted, mainly because  of the likely duplication  of
administiative  costs, since both types of institutions  operate as collective  investment  institutions  and
their main income consists of the commissions  they charge for their investment  services. Moreover,
open end mutual funds may be exposed  to sharp declines in market value if investors engage in large
scale redemptions. Authorization  to hold shares of closed end investment  trusts will provide scope to
pension funds to invest indirectly in a wide range of less liquid investments,  while maintaining  the
transparency, market valuation  and liquidity  of quoted  investments.
The strict investment  limits, especially  those that apply on the equities of individual
companies,  tend to put large pension funds at a competitive  disadvantage. Small pension funds are
able to place a greater proportion  of their funds in the equities  of individual  companies  with good
prospects since for them the binding limit may be the share of their own funds that can be invested  in
different instruments. For large pension funds, the binding  limit may easily be the share of an
issuer's total equity capital.  As a result, large pension funds are forced to invest a smaller proportion
of their total portfolio in the equities  of individual  companies  and their total returns may suffer in
comparison  to those of smaller funds.
The pension fund system was effectively  used to promote the privatization  of public utilities
and other state-owned  companies  in the mid-1980s. Various  measures were taken to protect pension
fund investments  in partially privatized enterprises  from risks associated  with political decisions.
Thus, the privatized firm's investment,  financing  and pricing policies had to be approved formally
both by the Government  and by an absolute  majority  of the private shareholders,  while AFPs retained
the full right to sell their holdings if any politically  motivated  actions  were  hought  by the Risk
Classification  Committee  to threaten the profitability  of the firm.
Pension fund investnents have also been used to encourage greater dispersion of ownership  of
private companies. A significant  strengthening  of the rights of minority shareholders  has protected
the interests  of pension funds as well as those of other minority shareholders. AFPs as pension fund
agents enjoy  full voting rights corresponding  to their shareholdings  in different companies.
2.8  Control and Supervision
The AFP system is supervised and controlled  by the Superintendency  of AFPs (SAFP), which
is an autonomous  agency linked to the Ministry  of Labor and Social Security. The Superintendent  of
AFPs is appointed  by the President  of the Republic and enjoys considerable  independence  and
authority. The SAFP has the right to authorize  and revoke the license of AFPs, to interpret the law
and issue detailed regulations  for the efficient functioning  of the system, and to promote changes in
the law as necessary.
The SAFP has a major responsibility  in supervising  the operations  and investments  of AFPs.
It requires the submission  of detailed  reports on investment  transactions  and the financial position  of
both the pension fund and the AFP, reviews the insurance  contracts  used by the AFPs with regard to
the offer of disability  and survivorship  pensions, and ensures that they credit contributions  received  to
members' accounts  and pay promptly the pension benefits  due.
17The SAFP also controls  the operation  of the profitability  reserve funds and the investment
reserves of AFPs.  It imposes  fines and supervises  the liquidatien  of AFPs that fail to maintain
adequate  investment  reserves or to comply with regulations  for the custody of investment  documents.
2.9  State Guarantees
The Chilean pension system involves  three types of guarantees  offered by the State. First,
there is a guarantee  for the payment  of a minimum  pension to affiliates  who have made contributions
for at least twenty  years.  If the balance on a member's account is not adequate  to buy a 'ife annuity
that pays at least an amount equal to the minimum  pension, the State undertakes  to make up the
difference. The State also offers a similar guarantee  to members  who opt for scheduled  withdrawals
but find after a number of years that the remaining  balance  provides them with a monthly  payment
that is lower than the minimum  pension.
Second, the State guarantees  the minimum  profitability  of pension funds.  An AFP would first
use the profitability  reserve of the pension fund, if one already exists, to make up any shortfall in the
rate of return and then draw on its investment  reserves.  An AFP that is unable to make up a shortfall
in the rate of return from its investment  reserves is forced into liquidation. The balances  of
individual  capitalization  accounts are transferred to other AFPs, with the State making up the shortfall
in profitability.
Finally, the State guarantees  the annuity  payments  for old age pensions as well as for
disability  and survivorship  pensions  of failed insurance  companies. The guarantee  covers 100%  of
the minimum  pension and 75% of tLe difference  between  the minimum  pension and the value of the
benefit involved  up to a limit of U.F. 45.
It should also be noted  that although  the State does not provide a guarantee  of a minimum  real
return, it does through its regulatory  framework  ensure that no pension fund will earn a minimum
real return in any twelve month period that is below half the average for the industry.
A question  that does not appear to have been addressed  so far concerns  the funding of the
guarantees  provided  by the State.  A fully funded system should in principle  also provide for the
funding of these guarantees. This would increase the confidence  of plan participants in the financial
solvency  of the system.  On the other hand, the accumulation  of reserves ty  the State would raise
familiar problems about  their transparency  and utilization. Perhaps, an alternative  solution  that would
be compatible  with the general adoption  of market-based  solutions would be to insure these contingent
obligations  with private domestic and foreign insurance  companies.
18III.  THE PERFORMANCE OF AFPs
This section reviews the performance  of the Chilean pension system over the first ten years of
its existence. Tne first part of the section  reviews the record of the industry as a whole, while the
second part focusses  on the performance  of individual  AFPs.
3.1  Total Funds
One of the most important indication  of the early success of the AFP system in Chile is the
accumulation  of substantial  long-term  savings. Total resources of the pension  funds increased  from
less than 1% of GDP in 1981  to II1%  in 1985  and 26.5  % in 1990 (Table 4).  The average annual rate
of growth was 47% over the whole period. It was nearly 80% between 1981  and 198S,  but
decelerated  to just over '6%  between 1985  and 1990.
Table  4
CHILEAN  PENSION  FUNDS  - TOTAL  REMOURCES
TOTAL  FUNDS  NET  CHANGE
Amount*  Growth  % GDP  Amount*  %  GDP
%  p.a.
1981  68.4  --  0.9  68.4  0.9
1982  213.1  211.5  3.6  144.7  2.6
1983  385.7  81.0  6.4  172.6  3.5
1984  508.3  31.8  8.6  122.6  3.3
1985  699.8  37.7  10.9  191.5  4.7
1986  918.0  31.2  13.4  218.2  4.7
1987  1122.7  22.3  15.5  204.7  5.1
1988  1378.2  22.8  16.5  255.5  4.5
1989  1699.4  23.3  19.7  321.2  6.5
1990  2249.4  32.4  26.5  550.0  10.9
1991/6  2696.5  39.7**  n.a.  894.2**  n.a.
*  billion  pesos  of December  1990
**  annualized
Source:  Habitat  (1991)
3.2  Coverage
As already noted, coverage in the Chilean pension system is far from universal. Indeed, one
of the main criticisms  of the new system is that its coverage is smaller than that of the old system in
the early 1970s. Since self-employed  people were not covered by the old system either and cannot
account  for the fall in coverage, the most likely explanation  is the decline  in formal employment  in
the 1970s  and early 1980s.
Despite its optional character for some workers, the total number  of affiliates increased
steadily from 1.4 million in 1981  to 2.3 million in 1985  and to 3.7 million in 1990. In relation to the
19labor force, the number of affiliates  rose from 30% in 1981  to 57% in 1985  and 79% in 1990. The
number  of active contributors  rose from 0.9 million in 1982  to 1.3 million  in 1985  and 2 million in
1990. As a proportion  of total affiliates, the number  of active contributors  fell from 63% in 1982  to
58% in 1985 and 52% in 1990  but in relation to the labor force, their number increased from 25% in
1981  to 33% in 1985  and 41% in 1990 (Table 5).
The number  of active contributors  is based on data for December  of each year and may
understate  the total number  of contributors. Their number  wouid be much greater if it was based on
all affiliates  who made at least one payment a year.  On the other hand, the number of members  who
made contributions  for the full year would be even smaller.  Since  pension benefits depend  on total
contributions  made and the investment  income earned, the low proportion  of full-year contributors
suggests  that a large number  of affiliates may fail to accumulate  adequate  balances  and may thus
receive  a low pension.  However, this problem is due to unstable employment  patterns and interrupted
contributions  and not to the new system. In fact, a well functioning  pay-as-you-go  system would also
pay lower pensions to workers with fewer contributions.
The difference  between affiliates  and active contributors  is mostly made up by inactive
accounts, mainly of unemployed  workers, and by members who are in temporary employment
schemes. But the large discrepancy  implies that there may also be problems  with evasion.
Moreover, the interruptions  in contributions  that the data indicate  suggest  the likelihood  of extensive




Affiliates  Active Contributors
(E labor force)  (%  labor force)  (% aff.)
1982  39.3  24.8  63.0
1983  43.0  28.0  65.1
1984  49.6  29.3  59.0
1985  56.8  32.9  57.9
1986  60.7  35.0  57.6
1987  66.4  38.5  58.0
1988  69.9  38.9  55.7
1989  74.3  41.0  55.3
1990  79.1  41.5  52.5
Source: Habitat (1991)
3.3  Contributions
Annual contributions  as a proportion  of GDP were relatively stable in the early 1980s  at
around 1.8%.  In 1988  they jumped to 3% and reached 3.4% of GDP in 1990 (Table 6). The
continuing  increase in the number  of contributors  and the rise of wages have been significant  factors,
especially  in 1989 and 1990.  However, the big jump in 1988 is also partly due to a change in
accounting  practice. Since 1988  the premiums  for disability  and term life insurance  have been
20included  with contributions  and deducted as commissions  paid with no effect on the total assets of the
pension fund.
ANNUAL CON2RIBUTIO?IS
% of  GDP  % of  Net  Change
1982  1.90  71.7
1983  1.73  49.0
1984  1.80  54.7
1985  1.77  38.0
1986  *.  .91  40.9
1987  1.92  37.8
1988  2.94  65.9
1989  3.25  49.7
1990  3.41  31.4
Sourcet  Habitat  (1991)
3.4  Recognition Bonds
Apart from annual contributions  and investment  income, another important  inflow into pension
funds are the proceeds  of recognition  bon.s paid to retiring workers.  Because  of the young age of
the new system and the fact that few older people opted  to transfer, the value of recognition  bonds
that have been paid so far is relatively small.  They reached 0.5% of GDP in 1990 and represented
5% of the increase in the value of pension funds in that year.  The proceeds  from the payment of
recognition  bonds is likely to increase  faster in the future as more transferees  reach retirement age.
3.S  Investment Returns
A significant  factor in the rapid increase in the total assets of the Chilean pension funds has
been the realization  of very high real rates of return.  These reflect  the high level of real interest rates
that prevailed  in the Chilean economy  for most of the 1980s,  but especially  the downward  trend of
real rates that boosted capital values and resulted in very large capital gains.
The average real rate of return on pension  funds amounted  to 13% over the 10-year  period.
Annual  rates of return experienced  large fluctuations,  ranging from 28.5% in 1982  down to a low
3.6% in 1984. Real returns exceeded  20% in the first 3 years of the funds' existence,  fell to less
than 5% in 1984, recovered  to over 12% in 1985 and 1986, fluctuated  around 6% between 1987 and
1989  and rebounded  to over 15% in 1990.
The fluctuation  in investment  returns has been caused  by large fluctuations  in the market
values  of investment  assets and concomitant  changes in capital  gains and losses. Capital  gains rn
most marketable  securities  increase when interest rates are falling (and decline when they are rising)
but returns on bank deposits rise when interest rates are rising.  The net impact on investment  returns
depends on the portfolio composition  of different funds. The growing importance  of corporate
equities  in fund portfolios  suggests  a stronger relationship  in future between  rates of return and
movements  in stockmarket  prices.
21Table 7
Inetment  leturns
Rate of  Investment  Investment
Return  Income  Income
(% assets)  (% of GNP)  (%  of Net Change)
1982  28.5  0.71  26.8
1983  21.3  1.96  55.5
1984  3.6  1.65  50.2
1985  13.4  3.04  65.2
1986  12.3  2.95  63.2
1987  5.4  3.30  65.0
1988  6.5  2.29  51.3
1989  6.9  4.25  65.0
1990  15.6  7.32  67.5
Source: Habitat (1991)
In fact,  the  sharp  rise  in investment  returns  in  1990  is attributed  to the  strong  performance  of
equities,  which  has  been  boosted  by  large  capital  gains  due  to the  revaluation  of  assets.  Thus,  in
1990,  investment  incwme amounted  to over  7%  in relation  to GDP  and  accounted  for  over  67%  of  the
increase  in pension  fund  assets.  The  strong  performance  of  the  stockmarket  caused  a  further
substantial  increase  in investment  returns  in the  first  half  of  1991.
3.6  Pensions  and  Other  Benefits
In  1990 pensions  paid  by  AFPs  represented  0.2%  of  GDP  or  20%  of  the  net  change  in total
pension  iund  assets,  while  transfers  to life  insurance  companies  for the  pdrchase  of  life  annuities  for
old  age  as  well  as disability  and  survivorship  pensions  amounted  to  0.6%  of  GDP  or  6%  of  the  net
change  in pension  fund  assets.  The  latter  represent  transfeis  of  capital  values.
the  number  of  pensioners  increased  from  less  than  5,000  in  1982 to over  87,000  in  1990.
Initially,  all pensions  were  either  disability  or  survivorship  pensions  but  the  number  of  old  age
pensions  reached  nearly  30,000  by  1990.  The  average  value  of  pensions  taken  in the  form  of  life
annuities  is 2.5  times  greater  than  that  of  pensions  based  on  scheduled  withdrawals.  There  are  two
reasons,  for this.  First,  because  life  annuities  are  not inherited,  they  can pay  a  higher  pension  than
scheduled  withdrawals.  And,  second,  retired  persons  cannot  use  the  life  annuity  option  if  their
account  balance  is not  adequate  to  cover  the  minimum  pension  requirement.  Many  pensioners  have
made  contributions  to the  new  system  for  a rather  short  period  and  this  may  expiain  the  number  of
people  with  inadequate  balances.
3.7  Commissions
AFPs  are  entitled  to  levy  a number  of different  commissions.  These  include:  a  flat  fee  per
collection;  a  percentage  fee  calculated  on  pensionable  salary;  a fee  for opening  new  accounts;  a  fee
per  pension  payment;  and  fees  for  voluntary  savings  accounts.  No  AFP  has  used  the  last  two  types  of
fees  and  only  one  has  imposed  fees  on  new  accounts.  As noted  earlier,  AFPs  used  to  charge  a
management  fee  calculated  on  the  outstanding  account  balance,  but  this  was disallowed  in September
221987. Apart from the flat fee per collection,  which is deducted  from member contributions,  all other
fees are paid in addition to contributions  and are deducted from a person's wages.
The average level of conmmissions,  which also include  the cost of buying insurance for
disability  and survivorship  pensions, increased  from 3.40% of pensionable  salary in 1981  to 4.83% in
1983. It has since declined steadily and reached 3.22% in 1990. These calculations  refer to
contributors  with a constant  pensionable  salary equivalent  to 12 U.F.  The cost for contributors  with
lower incomes  was much higher because  of the impact  of the flat fee per collection.
C-ommisa  ions
Gross  Net  Net  Nqet
% of  wages  % of wages  % contrib.  % assets
1982  3.56  1.77  17.7  14.3
1983  4.83  2.06  20.6  7.3
1984  4.63  2.32  23.2  5.6
1985  4.42  2.17  21.7  4.1
1986  4.21  2.05  20.5  3.4
1987  4.06  2.06  20.6  2.9
1988  3.93  1.43  14.3  2.9
1989  3.48  1.51  15.1  2.8
1990  3.22  1.'4  15.4  2.3
Note: Gross commissions include premiums for disability and survivorship
insurance
Source:  Habitat  (1991), Iglesias (1990)
One of the most persistent criticisms  of the new  system relates to the level of commissions
charged by AFPs, especially  on low income  affiliates. It is estimated  that, after  deducting  the
premiumn  for insuring disability  and survivorship  pensions,  commissions  amounted  on average to
2.3% of pe.asionable  income  or 23% of contributions  in the early i980s, but fell to 1.5% of wages or
15% of contributions  in more recent years.  Net commissions  as a ratio of average pension f,.nd
assets fell sharply from 14.3% in 1982  to 3.4% in 1986  and 2.3% in 199012.
The cost for low income  workers was, however, much higher, especially  in the early years of
operation  of the system. But, as already noted above, the flat fee per collection  has fallen in real
terms over the 1980s,  while in recent years several AFPs abolished  such fees altogether. For
instance, four AFPs -Cuprum, Futuro, Proteccion  and the ill-fated Bannuestra- did not charge a flat
fee in 1990, whila Habitat eliminated  this fee in 1991, after significantly  reducing its real value
12  Expense  ratios equal to 15  % of contributions  or 2% of assets  are rather high for mutual  funds but compare
;,very  favorably with those of most life insurance  companies.  Since the services offered by AFPs are a hybrid
between  those of mutual  funds  and life insurance  companies,  their expense ratios, which  have declined  substantially
over time, may not be unreasonable. However,  in the  light of the  very high real rates  of return on equity  achieved
by AFPs  in rectmt  years (see Table 14 below), a further lowering  of commission  charges  and expense ratios ought
to be expected  in the  Witure.
23during the 1980s. Moreover, since 1998  the flat fee is deducted from the accounts of active
contributors  only.  Unemployed  workers and workers who have retired from the labor force do not
pay contributions  and do not pay any commissions.
3.8  Account Transfers
A fundamental  feature of the Chilean system is the right to transfer accounts  between AFPs.
This stimulates  competition  in the system and ensures a high level of operational  and investment
efficiency. Nevertheless,  concern is often expressed  that AFPs may incur unduly large expenditures
in advertising  and marketing  their services and in trying to induce affiliates  to transfer their accounts.
It is estimated  that as much as 30% or 40% of operating costs may be absorbed by promotional
expenses. Moreover, advertising campaigns  appear to place undue emphasis  on short-term






1985  211  2107  10.0
1986  178  2438  7.3
1987  183  2741  6.7
1988  300  3037  9.9
1989  310  3327  9.3
1990  384  3624  10.6
Source:  Iglesias  (1990)
A related concern refers to the expenses incurred in processing  account transfers.  In systems
that lack sufficient  computerization  and automation  this may imply high costs for employers  who have
to amend  their records every time employees  transfer their accounts. At present, administrative
delays in processing  account transfers result in an effective limitation  on transfers of no more than 2 a
year.  'Tere  are, however, suggestions  that account transfers should  be subject  to tighter limits.  In
addition, consideration  may need to be given to imposing  some limitations  on the promotional
activities  of AFPs, especially  with regard to the transparency  of their advertising  campaigns.
Account  transfers have grown from 178,000  in 1986  to 384,000 in 1990. As a proportion of
all accounts,  transfers fluctuated  between  6.7% in 1987  and 10.6% in 1990. In recent years, AFPs
have adopted aggressive  competitive  strategies  to attract high income affiliates  and this may explain
the increasing  mobility  of accounts.
3.9  Investment  Profiles
Reflecting  the strict investment  rules imposed  on pension funds, their assets were initially
mostly invested in bank deposits, mortgage bonds and central bank'treasury securities. Thus, in
1981, 62% of assets were placed in bank deposits, 9% in mortgage bonds and 28% in state securities.
Between 1982 and 1984, the share of bank deposits  declined  sharply.  In 1983, following  the banking
24crisis, bank deposits accounted  for only 3% of total pension  fund assets, while the share of mortgage
bonds rose to 51  % and of state securities to 44%.  Since then, the share of mortgage bonds declined
steadily, reaching 16% in 1990. However, the real value of mortgage bonds in the portfolio of




Bank  State  Mortgage  Corporate  Corporate
Deposits  Securities  Bonds  Bonds  Equities
1981  61.9  28.1  9.4  0.6  -
1982  26.6  26.0  46.8  0.6  -
1983  2.7  44.5  50.7  2.2  -
1984  12.9  42.2  43.1  1.8  -
1985  20.9  42.6  35.3  1.1  -
1986  23.2  46.7  25.5  0.8  3.8
1987  28.3  41.5  21.4  2.6  6.2
1988  29.5  49.7  20.6  6.4  8.1
1989  21.5  41.6  17.7  9.1  10.1
1990  17.4  44.1  16.1  11.1  11.3
1991/6  14.3  39.5  14.6  11.7  19.9
Source: Habitat (1991)
The most significant changes in the second half of the 1980s were the continued ir  rease in
the share of central bank securities to 42  % in 1990, within a more or less constant  toWtW  for state
securities, and the considerable  expansion  of holdings of corporate bonds and corporate equities, each
with 1X%  of total pension fund assets in 1990. By June 1991, equity holdings  reached 20% of
pension fund assets, mostly  as a result of the large appreciation  of equity values in the booming
Santiago  stockmarket.
The investment  profiles of pension funds have been shaped by the tight investment  rules that
have imposed  strict limits on equity investments. The significance  of pension  funds for each class of
instruments,  and the potential for further expansion  once investment  rules become more liberal, is
shown by the share of pension fund holdings in the total market for each class of instrument  (Table
11). Thus, pension funds held 20% of all bank deposits in 1990, 56% of mortgage  bonds, 38% of
central bank securities, nearly 100% of treasury securities, 56% of corporate bonds and 9% of
corporate equities. Total pension fund assets corresponded  to 20% of all liabilities  of the Chilean
financial  system and to 40% of total bank credits.
The growth of pension fund investments  in corporate securities since 1986 highlights  the
impact  that pension funds can have on the development  and deepening  of the Chilean capital markets.
But the relatively low share of total corporate equities  held by pension funds underscores  the large
potential  that still exists for a much greater impact.
Pension fund resources are expected  to continue  growing at a fast rate.  Even if the rate of
return cn pension fund assets is equal to the growth rate of GDP, the continuing  inflow of net annual
contributions  equivalent  to 3.4% of GDP imply  that as a minimum  pension fund resources will reach
2560% of GDP in another ten years time.  With higher real returns, the ratio of pension funds to GDP
will be higher and may even reach  100%  of GDP by the year 2000.  With the continuing  tight limits
on other investments,  it is very likely that investments  in corporate equities will be encouraged  further
by appropriate  gradual relaxation  of current limits on such investments.
Table  11
Significance  of Pension  Fund  investments
(%  of class  of instruments)
1981  1985  1990
Bank  deposits  3.0  11.9  19.9
Central  bank securities  10.9  22.9  38.0
Treasury  securities  0.7  46.5  99.7
Mortgage  bonds  2.2  48.2  56.1
Corporate  bonds  1.9  7.7  55.6
Corporate equities  - - 8.6
All financial  assets  1.7  15.8  19.7
Bank  credits  1.6  15.6  40.1
Source: Habitat  (1991)
In this respect, it is worth noting that the rule that prohibited investments  in overseas assets
has probably  been instrumental  in channeling  pension fund investments  into corporate securities  of
Chilean companies  and in stimulating  the development  of the domestic capital markets. Although
complete  prohibition may be inadvisable  as it would prevent a proper diversification  of country  risk,
complete  freedom may also be counterproductive  as it would deprive the benefits of the increased
availability  of long-term funds for the domestic capital markets. The Chilean experience  suggests  that
pension funds can be an effective  force in stimulating  innovation, improving  efficiency  and inducing
desirable fiscal, legal and regulatory changes.
3.10  Privatizatdon and Dispersion of Corporate Ownership
The Chilean pension funds have played a very significant  part in the privatization  of several
state-owned  companies, including  Chile Metro, Chilgener, Chilquinta, Endesa, Entel, Laboratories
Chile, Pilmaiquen,  Schwager, Soquiniich  and Telefonos. The total holdings  of all pension funds
range from 10% to 35% of the equity capital of these companies. Holdings in privatized  companies
still represent  the lion's share of pension  fund equity holdings, accounting  in 1990 for nearly 90% of
their total investments  in corporate equities.
The low level of other  equity holdings is due to the combination  of strict restrictions  on
investments  in equities of companies  with concentrated  ownership  and the apparent reluctance  of
Chilean companies  to suffer a dilution  of control through public listing and sale of equity stakes to
pension funds and other investors and especially  to submit  themselves  to the requirements  of Chapter
12 of Law 3,500 that governs the operations  of pension funds (see above). Thus, the use of pension
funds for encouraging  greater dispersion  of corporate ownership  has not produced  any significant
results as yet.  To some extent, this may be due to the strictness  of the applied investment  rules.  In
fact, a relaxation  of these rules may prove more effective in achieving  this objective.
263.11  Structure  of AFPs
The Chilean pension fund market has been characterized  since its inception  by a small number
of management  companies  and a high concentration  ratio.  When the system was first established, 12
AFPs were authorized. Several of these were established  with the participation  of large baking
groups. Thus, Provida was related  to Banco  de Santiago, Santa Maria to Banco  de Chile, Invierta to
Banco  de Conception, San Cristobal to the B.H.C. Bank, Alameda to the B.H.I.F. Bank and El
Libertador  to Banco  Edwards.
Table 12
Market Shares and Industry Concentration
1981  1985  1990
Pension Funds
Provida  33.8  28.6  26.0
Santa Maria  27.6  22.9  19.2
Habitat  9.9  15.2  17.5
Union  12.4  10.4  8.4
Summa  4.5  10.2  9.6
Cuprum  1.6  2.9  6.2
C2  61.4  51.5  45.2
C3  73.8  66.7  62.7
C4  83.7  77.1  72.3
HHI  2220  1795  1577
Affiliates
Provida  32.9  29.9  29.0
Santa Maria  20.4  18.8  20.1
Habitat  5.7  11.8  17.1
Union  19.4  13.6  9.1
Summa  4.4  8.7  8.0
Invierta  9.1  6.7  3.9
C2  53.3  48.7  49.1
C3  72.7  62.3  66.2
C4  81.8  74.1  75.2
HHI  2028  1714  1729
Source:  Habitat (1991)
Following  the baiking crisis of 1982, these AFPs became temporary wards of the State,
although  they were swiftly reprivatized. 40% of Provida was sold to Bankers Trust Pacific Ltd and
51 % of Santa Maria to Aetna Insurance  Company. The remainder  of the shares of these 2 AFPs was
sold to several  thousand individual  shareholders  as part of the program known as "popular
capitalism".
In 1985, two AFPs -Alameda and San Cristobal- merged to create AFP Union with major
participation  by American International  Group (AIG). Three new AFPs were established  in recent
years -Proteccion in 1986, Futuro in 1988  and Bannuestra  in 1990- although  the last-named  was
27unsuccessful  and is now under liquidation. The French insurance company, AGF, acquired a 40%
stake in Proteccion in 1990.
Of the 14 AFPs that were in operation in 1990, 5 were owned by trade associations  or labor
unions, including  Habitat (owned by a trade association  from the construction  industry), Magister
(teachers  union) and Cuprum (workers from the copper mining industry), 5 were owned by a few
local shareholders,  and 4 had major foreign participation  combined  with a large number of local
shareholders.
Concentration  in the industry  is very high, although  it has fallen considerably  in recent years.
Moreover, market shares have not been constant  and relative positions have changed  significantly
over time.  Thus, the largest 3 AFPs have suffered a fall in their share of total pension funds from
74% in 1981  to 63% in 1990. The level of concentration  in terms of affiliates has declined  less
sharply from 73% to 66% (table 12). These changes  in concentration  are also highlighted  by changes
in the Herfindahl index (HHI).  In terms of total pension funds, the Herfindahl  index  fell from 2220
in 1981  to 1577 in 1990, while in terms of affiliates it fell less drastically  from 2020 to 1729.
In the United States  a Herfindahl  index of 1800  is considered  high and a threshold for
initiating  antitrust examinations  of proposed  mergers and acquisitions. However, it is important  to
note that there is no direct relationship  between  the degree of concentration  of an industry and the
level of competition. Oligopolistic  markets are not synonymous  with uncompetitive  markets. In
contestable  industries  subject to low entry and exit costs, the threat of potential  competition  from new
entrants may be as important  as the number of actual competitors  in influencing  the behavior of
market participants. In Chile, the high returns achieved  by AFPs in recent years have stimulated  new
entry.  One new AFP has already been established  in 1991  and 3 more are under formation.
3.12  Investment Returns
A comparison  of market shares in total funds and affiliates reveals that the two largest AFPs
used to have above average levels of total funds per affiliate  but in recent years they fell to below
average. This may reflect their inability  to earn as high returns as the smaller AFPs, a result that is
most probably  caused by the adverse impact  of the strict investment  rules on their overall
performance. This particularly applies  to investments  in corporate equities that have been authorized
since 1985. Detailed  data on the returns achieved  by different AFPs for the pension funds under their
management  show that Provida and Santa Maria used to earn above average returns prior to 1985  but
lagged  behind the average for the industry in more recent years.  For instance, in 1990, Provida's
real rate of return was 13.3% and Santa Maria's 14.6% against an unweighted  average of 17.2%
(Habitat, 1991).
A more interesting  comparison  relates to the real rates of return of individual  accounts. These
differ from overall investment  returns because  they take account of two commissions  charged by
different AFPs: the management  fee over the total value of the fund, which was eliminated  in 1987,
and the flat fee'3. The regressive impact  of these commissions  in the early years of the system is
13  The  returns  on individual  accounts  do not reflect  differences  in the  level  of commissions  on contributions
which are paid by affiliates  on top of their 10% contribution  rate.
28clearly shown in Table 13 which reports, for the period between  June 1981 and December 1990, the
investment  returns on the total pension fund for each AFP as well as the average real rates of return
for three different sizes of accounts: pensionable  income  equivalent  to 5 UF, 15 UF and 60 UF.
Table  13
Real Rates of Return
(June  1981  - December  1990)
'J.F.  U.F.  U.F.  Total
5  15  60  Fund
Cuprum  9.22  11.22  11.92  16.3
Invierta  7.06  10.25  11.31  13.9
Union  7.49  10.26  11.20  14.2
Planvital  7.29  10.12  11.08  13.7
Summa  7.61  10.00  10.82  13.4
Concordia  8.48  10.20  10.80  14.3
Habitat  9.35  10.35  10.71  12.8
El Libertador  7.38  9.80  10.63  12.4
Magister  6.83  9.21  10.03  13.1
Santa  Maria  6.87  9.11  9.89  12.6
Provida  6.48  8.94  9.78  13.1
Weighted  average  7.53  9.69  10.43
Source:  Habitat  (1991)
The difference  between the return on low income and high income accounts  was on average
nearly 3%.  Compounded  over a forty year period this would cause very large differences in the
accumulated  capital for different groups of affiliates. Thus, 100 pesos compounded  at 7.5% per year
(the average return for low income accounts)  would accumulate  1804  pesos after 40 years, while the
same amount compounded  at 10.5% per year (the average return for high income accounts)  would
amass 5426 pesos or slightly over 3 times as much.  100  pesos paid annually over 40 years and
compounded  at 7.5% would grow into a capital fund of 22,725 pesos, whereas compounded  at 10.5%
the capital fund would reach 50,725.
It should, however, be stressed that the results reported in Table 13 are based on average
performance  over the first ten years of the system.  As the management  fee has been eliminated  and
the flat fee has declined  in real terms, the difference  in performance  has also become smaller.  In
fact, since 1988, the gap in investrnent  returns between low and high income  accouidts  has narrowed
significantly. On average, it is now less than I percentage  point.
3.13  High Concentration, Competition, and Corporate Governance
The high concentration  of the pension fund sector is causing  some concern because  of its
potentially  adverse  impact on competition  and efficiency. It should, however, be stressed that high
concentration  need not result in lack of competition  or high costs.  First, the relaxation  of entry
criteria has increased  the threat of potential  competition. Second, large AFPs may benefit from
economies  of scale that could be reflected in lower commission  charges. In fact, the three largest
AFPs charge lower commission  rates than the average.
29As already mentioned  above, the underperformance  of the large AFPs is the result of the tight
investment  rules on equity holdings  that have penalized  large AFPs.  Individual  accounts have shown
a low price and return elasticity, which may reflect high consumer costs in terms of inconvenience  of
transferring accounts  and perhaps also the expectation  among affiliates  that differences in performance
are unlikely  to persist for long.  Another factor may also be the cost of obtaining  good information
about prices and returns.
The apparent low price and return elasticity  of individual  accounts suggests  that large AFPs
may contirihue  to underperform  the market and still suffer relatively modest  falls in their market
shares, especially  in terms of affiliates. To enhance  the elasticity of demand, it is important  to
improve the flow and quality of information  to affiliates.
The high concentration  of the industry is also related to corporate governance  issues and the
influence  that representatives  of a few large AFPs may have on corporate policies, especially in
aompanies  where the combined  shareholdings  of different AFPs give them effective management
control. Already, with a relatively low share of corporate equities, there is some concern about the
influence  of the managers  of AFPs in privatized companies,  where AFPs have large combined
holdings.
It should, however, be noted that the high level of concentration  may avoid the "free-rider"
problem and emphasis  on short-term corporate performance  that might result from a fragmentation  of
the pension fund sector.  When institutional  investors  have small stakes in individual  companies,  they
have weaker incentives  to collect and process information  about the affairs of individual  companies
and to take an active interest in their future prospects. There is a risk in a fragmented  pension fund
sector that no pension fund will take care to strengthen  the management  and long-term performance  of
individual  companies. Excessive  reliance may then be placed on the threat of takeover and other
market mechanisms  to stimulate  corporate efficiency, which may not always be effective. However,
close involvement  in corporate governance  presupposes  that pension funds invest in information
gathering and processing  and deve'op the required expertise  to ensure that their interventions  in
corporate affairs have beneficial  effects.  Thus, the high concentration  of the pension fund sector may
be a blessing in disguise, but only if pension fund managers  discharge  their corporate duties with
responsibility  and foresight.
3.14  Financial Results
Despite  their successful  record in investing  members' funds, the financial results of AFPs as
profit-making  entities were pretty dismal in the first five years of the operation  of the new system.
They suffered substantial  losses in 1981  and 1982, mostly because  of large start-up expenses that were
amortized  within the first four years of operations. Their activities became  profitable  after 1984 but
their cumulative  results  remained  negative  until 1986. However, the profitability  of AFPs rose
considerably  over the past few years and reached real rates of return on equity of 50% and 47% in
1989  and 1990, respectively.
The profitability  of AFPs can be analyzed  in two different ways.  One is to treat them as
financial  service providers with a relatively  small asset base and very low leverage. This approach
would normally show a high return on assets (ROA) and also a high gross income margin (gross
income as a percentage  of average assets). The alternative  approach is to treat them as financial
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under their management. This approach  would show much lower ROA and gross income margins. In
both approaches,  however, the profit ratio (i.e. the net profit as a ratio of gross income) and the
return on equity (ROE) would be the same.
Table 14 summarizes  the financial  results of the AFPs for two sub-periods, 1982-85  and
1986-90,  as well as for the whole period 1982-90. As it can be seen, based on their own assets only,
AFPs achieved  high gross income margins of 85% and 123% of average assets in the two subperiods
and 107%  for the whole period.  Their ROAs were also very high in the more recent period at 26%.
However, in relation  to the total assets of pension filuds, their gross margins were over 7% in the
first sub-period but as low as 3.3% in the second subperiod. Moreover, the return on total pension
fund assets was less than 1  %, which is comparable  to the ROAs achieved  by banks and insurance
companies  in developed  countries.
Table 14
Financial Results of AFPs
PR  GIM  ROA  LEV  ROE
Based on PYFP  assets
Average 15)82-85  -1.4  84.8  -1.2  1.S  -1.8
Average 1986-90  21.4  122.7  26.3  1.4  36.8
Average  1982-90  13.7  106.6  14.6  1.4  20.9
Based on oension funds
Average 1982-85  -1.4  7.5  -0.1  18.0  -1.8
Average 1986-90  21.4  3.3  0.7  52.6  36.8
Average 1982-90  13.7  4.1  0.6  34.8  20.9
Source:  Based on data reported in Habitat (1991)
As already noted, the ROE is unaffected  by whether  the focus of analysis  is the asset base of
the AFPs or the  pension funds under management. After a difficult first subperiod, AFPs have come
to earn very high real rates of return.  The high returns may attract new entry so that the threat of
potential  competition  may force AFPs to adjust voluntarily  their prices.  However, if potential
competition  proves ineffective  in lowering  prices and ROEs, perhaps because  of economies  of scale
enjoyed  by the larger institutions,  then regulatory intervention  may be justified.  This could impose
price caps similar to those used in the regulation  of electricity  and other public utilities in the United
Kingdom  and other developed  countries.
Although AFPs provide a competitive  service in a privately-managed  system, the pension
system is government-mandated  and has several features of a public utility that could  justify
intervention,  not only in regulating  investment  patterns but also in regulating  levels of prices and
profits.  However, such intervention  would be advisable  only if the threat of entry from potential
31competitors  fails to keep prices and profits at competitive  levels.  As already noted, the high returns
of AFPs in recent years have stimulated  the interest of 4 new competitors.
3.15  Control and Supervision
The control and supervision  of AFP operations jc entrusted with the SAFP, a specialized
supervisory  authority that was established  by the same law that created the pension system.  The
SAFP is divided into several divisional  units that deal with different aspects of pension fund
operations. It employs  over 100 qualified  staff, including  several lawyers and between  30 and 40
financial auditors  and examiners.
Three divisions play an important  part in supervising  the AFPs.  These are the Division of
Supervision  of Institutions,  the Division of Benefits  and Insura ice, and the Division  of Finance.  The
first is responsible  for receiving and examining  the financial reports of AFPs on their own position
and on the pension fund under their management.  It verifies their compliance  with all existing
regulations  and undertakes  on-site inspections. It also manages  the dissolution  of AFPs that are
subject to liquidation. The second is concerned  with ensuring that services to affiliates, especially  the
collection  of contributions,  the maintenance  of accounts and the payment  of benefits, are provided  on
a timely and satisfactory  way.  It also controls the insurance  contracts used by AFPs for the coverage
of disability  and survivorship  pensions. The third supervises  the management  of the pension fund and
reviews the effect of investment  regulations. It has the important  role of proposing changes in
investment  regulations in the light of developments  in financial  markets.
The supervision  of the AFP system is quite effective. It is based on daily reports on
investment  transactions and monthly reports on their financial  position and overall performance.
Compliance  of investment  limits is under constant  monitoring. AFPs are given each month their
market shares in total pension funds for the calculation  of their individual  investment  limits.  If they
exceed their limits by more than 3% of the value of the fund as a result of changes in market share or
in market valuation, AFPs are allowed up to a year to bring their position  within the limits.  If the
excess is less than 3%, they are not subject to any time limit, but they are prohibited  from making
new purchases until they fall back within  their limits.  An indication  of the effectiveness  of
supervision is that whereas 3 AFPs have failed over the past decade, there was no loss to the pension
funds managed  by these AFPs.
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4.1  Policy Issues
There can be little doubt that the performance  of the Chilean AFP system over its first ten
years of operation has not only been highly successful  but has exceeded  all reasonable  expectations  at
the time of its launching. However, despite its impressive  record, it may be too early after only ten
years of existence  to conclude that the AFP system represents  a robust, efficient and equitable
solution  to the perennial problem  of providing  adequate  and affordable pensions  to retired workers
and their dependents. As already noted, the financial  contracts  underlying  the AFP system span more
than sixty years.  Ten years are clearly too short a period to draw definitive  conclusions.
The Chilean AFP system has a number of operating characteristics  that define its advantages
and disadvanLages  over other types of pension systems. It is a compulsory  system for employed
workers" 4. Compulsory  participation  is premised on the argument  that people behave myopically
and will not provide adequately  for their financial needs in old age.  But compulsory  participation
imposes  an obligation  on governments  to ensure the integrity  and solvency  of the pension system.  A
system with compulsory  participation  should also aim for modest pension benefits. Individuals  who
want to achieve  higher replacement  rates can engage in voluntary saving. In Chile, the contribution
rate is fairly modest and the regulatory  framework is both robust and effective. Thus, the AFP
system meets the basic requirements  of a compulsory  system.
The AFP system is a fully-funded  defined contribution  system, at least as far as old age
pensions are concerned. As such, it has a strong link between  contributions  and benefits and avoids
the redistributive  effects and labor market distortions  of defined benefit schemes. But, in defined
contribution  systems, the allocation  of risks is tilted against  workers.  Affiliates  assume the
replacement,  investment,  inflation  and solve.,cy  risks of pension savings. They clearly run the risk of
ending  up with low pensions relative to their contributions  or relative to their pensionable  salaries 1 5.
In Chile, pension funds achieved  extremely  high real rates of return in the 1980s. Even if real
returns fall to more sustainable  levels in die future, they will be able to provide adequate  benefits to
their affiliates. However, the risk of adverse developments  in financial  markets and investment  losses
is still there and is largely assumed  by affiliates.
Several measures  have been taken to protect the interests  of affiliates. The use of indexed
instruments  provides protection  against inflation,  even though individual  account balances  are not
t!iemselves  indexed. However, indexation  of financial  contracts is really effective only when inflation
is constant  or falling.  If inflation  is rising, and especially  when it is accelerating  at a rapid pace,
indexation  mechanisms  become  less effective. The real value of accumulated  balances  and future
benefits  may then be seriously eroded. In the mid and late 1980s,  the Chilean economy  benefitted
from growing macroeconomic  stability  and this has had benef'cial effects on the performance  of
"4  For a fuller discuission  of the operating  characteristics  of different  types of contractual  savings  institutions,
see Vittas and Skully (1991).
''  For a discussion  of pension funds as providers  of retirement  income insurance,  see Bodie (1990).
33pension funds.  Nevertheless,  the future success of the Chilean AFP system, like that of any other
pension system, is strongly dependent  on the continuing  maintenance  of macroeconomic  stability.
But even if inflation  is moderate  and stable, members  of defined contribution  systems are
exposed  to investment  risk.  The Chilean regulatory framework  has various provisions  to ensure that
pension funds achieve  minimum  levels of investnent returns by comparison  to the average.
However, the permissible  range still allows for substantial  differences  in investment  returns,
especially  if these are compounded  over forty years or more.
Over the first ten years of its operation, the investments  of the AFP system have been
protected from the vicissitudes  of financial markets by the strict investment  rules that limited exposure
to corporate equities. But, as the resources mobilized  by pension funds have continued  to grow and
as corporate equities are widely  perceived  to offer on average and in the long run greater real returns
than other financial  instruments,  the investment  rules have been relaxed to allow greater allocation  of
funds into corporate equities. Although  the initial results from the liberalization  of investment  rules
have been impressive, mainly because  of the booming  conditions  in the Santiago  stockmarket,  the
growing proportion  of assets held in corporate equities  will increase  the exposure of pension funds to
a possible downturn in market prices with a clear possibility  that investment  returns may become
negative  over particular  periods.  The possibility  of greater divergence  in investment  returns between
different management  companies  will also increase, causing  an unintentional  redistribution  among
affiliates  and perhaps creating strong pressures for pnlitical intervention.
Another policy issue is the exposure to possible political pressure to divert a proportion  of the
large tesources mozbilized  by the pension funds into socially desirable  projects that do not have easy
access  to market soarces of funds.  Already, there has been considerable  pressure to channel funds
into housing, which have been partially overcome by the authorization  of investment  in real estate
companies. More recently, there have been pressures  to direct funds into worthwhile  economic
projects.  Although  the provision of project finance could  be organized in a securitized  form that
could meet the requirements  and objectives  of pension funds, there is also a danger that pension funds
may be induced into direct involvement  in project finance.
A further important  policy issue concerns  the authorization  to invest in overseas assets and
thus to diversify country risk. Complete  freedom to invest in overseas assets may be
counterproductive  as it would deprive the benefits  of Lhe  increased  availability  of long-term funds for
the domestic capital markets, but complete  prohibition  may tlso be inadvisable  as it would prevent a
proper diversification  of country risk.  As already noted, the Chilean pension funds were not
permitted  to invest in overseas assets during the first ten years of their existence. The law was
changed  in 1990  to allow a gradual increase in such investments  up to a targeted 10% of all funds,
although the regulation  that would enable the undertaking  of overseas investments  has yet to be
issued.
The Chilean pension funds have played a very significant  part in the privatization  of state-
owned companies  in the second half of the 1980s. On the other hand, their contribution  to the
dispersion  of corporate ownership  has been rather limited, mainly because of the unwillingness  of
Chilean corporations  to accept a dilution of control.  However, an issue of great importance  that is
likely to grow in significance  in future is the role of pension funds in corporate govermance.  This is
an issue that bedevils the financial  systems of most developed  countries. There are no easy answers,
34although it may be preferable  to rely on a strengthening  of sanctions in the event of misuse and abuse
of corporate power rather than on prohibiting  the involvement  of pension funds in corporate
management  issues. Perhaps, the th-eat of regulation  in the event of misuse of corporate power may
be more effective  in controlling  the behavior of managers  of AFPs than any actual rules and
proscriptions.
Finally, an issue of concern to policymakers  and contributing  affiliates  regards the
promotional  and administrative  expenses incurred by AFPs in seeking  to expand  their business  and
attract more affiliates. As a system based on decentralized  management,  the AFP system is bound to
incur higher marketing  and operating costs than efficiently-run  centralized  social security systems and
national  provident funds. However, decentralized  management  with its reliance  on competition
among a number  of suppliers provides a guarantee  that pension systems will not suffer from excessive
bureaucratic  processes  and inefficient  operations. Moreover, decentralized  mnanagement  can make a
more important  contribution  to the development  of capital markets and the promotion  of financial
innovation. The threat of regulation, as well as the threat of potential competition  from new entry,
may be quite effective in keeping  expense ratios within reasonable  levels.
It is clear that any decentralized  funded pension system, including  the Chilean AFP system, is
exposed  to many  potential risks.  There is exposure to accelerating  inflation  and  macroeconomic
instability;  to stockmarket  fluctuations;  to political pressures  to divert funds to socially desirable but
uneconomic  uses; to excessive  and undue influence  over corporate affairs; and to high operating and
marketing  costs.  Government  has a basic role to play in ensuring that the system operates within a
robust regulatory  framework and is subject to effective control and supervision. Government  also has
a role to play in providing  guarantees  that protect a minimum  level of benefits  for affiliates  that have
interrupted  and inadequate  contributions  and for those that suffer from the failure of particular AFPs.
However, a most important  role of government  is to resist pressures  to impose  restrictions  on the
operations  of pension funds that may undermine  their safety and lower their returns.
It is important  to remember  that most social security systems in Latin American countries
were originally  established  as fully or partially funded systems and were converted, initially de facto
and subsequently  de jure, into  unfunded "pay-as-you-go' systems  when inflation  eroded the value of
accumulated  balances and political pressures  led to increased  benefits without  a commensurate
increase in contribution  rates.  However, the Chilean AFP system is based on individual  capitalization
accounts  with a strong link between contributions  and benefits.  Affiliates  may represent a strong
constituency  against the use of pension funds for short-term  political purposes. Although it is hoped
that political pressures  will be resisted, only time will tell how successful  such resistance can be.
4.2  Lessons of the Chilean Experience
The Chilean experience  shows that a bold reform of a bankrupt public pension system is
feasible, despite the presence of several complex issues  that inhibit similar initiatives  in other
countries. Although  the Chilean reform is still confronted  with some important  issues, such as the
high concentration  of the industry, the less than universal coverage, the low price elasticity of demand
and the role of AFPs in corporate governance, its experience  shows that the more fundamental  issues
confronting  a radical pension reform, such as the fiscal impact of the transition  to the new system, the
equitable  treatment  of old system pensioners, the absence  of well developed  ftnancial  markets and the
35weakness  of regulation and supervision, can be overcome if there is strong political will to create a
robust, efficient and fair system.
Perhaps the strongest objection, which is inhibiting  many governments  from adopting
similarly  bold reforms, concerns  the fiscal implications  of the transition from a long-standing  PAYG
public system to a fully-funded  private one.  It is clear that, as a result of the loss of large numbers of
active contributors,  the public system would suffer substantial  losses in revenues but would continue
to be liable  for the payment of pensions  to people already retired and to those workers who would go
into retirement  during the transition  period.  The public system would also have to finance the
accrued pension rights of workers who transfer to the new system.
The deficit of the public system following  a pension reform would exacerbate fiscal pressures
and would make more difficult  the achievement  of a balanced  budget. In Chile, the deficit of the
public system amounted  to 5% of GDP in the early 1980s. The payment  of recognition  bonds on
retirement has deferred the full fiscal impact  of the reform, the future burden of which has been
substantially  mitigated  by the strong performance  of the Chilean economy  in the late 1980s.
Another complex issue relates to the equitable  treatment of different generations  of workers.
This issue is often complicated  further by the absence  of good records on the past contributions  of
individual  workers.  In Chile, the absence  of good records has led to protracted  disputes and ad hoc
solutions. But encouraged  by the effective  increase in net wages offered to transferring workers, ihe
transfer of workers to the new system has been quite successful. The offer of financial incentives  .as
clearly allevated any underlying  disputes about the true value of accrued benefits.
A third issue is the absence  of well functioning  financial markets. A traditional argument
against  fully funded social security systems  has been the concern that in the absence  of active
securities  markets, accumulated  funds might be used as captive  sources for funding government
deficits. Without active and efficient  financia!  markets, privately-managed  personal  pension plans
would be unable to invest  wisely and safely their accumulated  funds.  In Chile, the solution  to this
problem  has been the adoption of strict investment  rules that emphasized  safety and profitability as the
main investment  objectives  of pension funds.  The ac:umulation  of large amounts  of funds has
stimulated  substantial  changes in regulation  and market practice and has contributed  over time to the
development  of the Chilean financial markets.
The fourth issue relates to the absence of strong and effective  regulatory and supervisory
mechanisms. In the wake of the extensive  problems  faced by the banking  systems  of many
developing  countries, there is considerable  reticence in many countries in promoting  new types of
long-term  conv  actual savings institutions  that presuppose  for their success strong and effective
systems  of regulation and supervision. In Chile, a strong superintendency  was created with the
authority  to supervise  effectively  the pension funds and take corrective action.
The Chilean experience  suggests  that advocates  of these concerns may overstate their
importance. Thus, the deficit of the publi: system may be financed, partly from general tax revenues
and partly by issuing government  bonds that, initially at least, would be taken up by the new pension
funds.  While equitable  treatment during the transition  period may be difficult  to achieve, reform
action may still be taken on terms and conditions  that avoid  excessive inequity.
36The argument about the absence  of well developed  financial  markets may also be unduly
defensive. It overlooks  the dynamic  interaction  that would evolve between growing pension funds
and emerging financial  markets and thus underestimates  the contribution  that private pension funds
can make to the development  of financial  markets. In any way, governments  can take positive action
to eliminate  or reduce legal, regulatory and, above  all, fiscal impediments  to the development  of
financial markets.
Finally, although  the problems  caused by weak regulatory  traditions cannot be easily
overcome, governments  that are firm in their desire to reform their social pension systems can take
action to create independent  and effective  supervisory  agencies. Such action may include  hiring and
training qualified  staff, building adequate  data processing  and information  systems, and strengthening
enforcement  mechanisms.
Admittedly,  most of these issues  take a long time to resolve.  But the long-term nature of
some reforms should be an argument  for bringing  forward rather than delaying action.  Faced with
the complexity  of these issues, many  governments  prefer to implement  limited technical changes in
their existing  systems, such as reducing  benefits by delaying  the normal retirement age or lowering
pension replacement  rates and/or increasing  revenues  by raising contribution  rates or providing
supplementary  funds through ad hoc "earmarked"  taxes on various goods and services. Such changes
may, however, do little more than postpone  the undertaking  of a more 'undamental  and bolder
reform.
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